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VICTIM FAULT AND COMPARATIVE FAULT IN STRICT
LIABILITY
In 1971, the Louisiana Supreme Court in Langlois v. Allied Chemical'
departed from a negligence-restricted concept of fault under Louisiana
Civil Code article 2315 and moved toward a more inclusive concept of
fault. In Langlois, the court held the defendant liable for injuries caused
by a leak at defendant's chemical plant based upon "fault as analogized
from the conduct required under Civil Code article 669 and others." '2
The court further noted that "proof of lack of negligence and lack of
imprudence [would] not exculpate the defendant." 3 Although Langlois
did not confront article 2317, the court's recognition of a non-negligent
type of fault was important to the development of relational responsibility
strict liability. In 1974 and 1975 the Louisiana Supreme Court did address
articles 2317, 2318, and 2321 and found within them the basis for non-
negligent strict liability. 4
Since Langlois and its progeny, three areas of strict liability have
evolved. The first is strict liability, sometimes called absolute liability,
for land related hazardous activities. The second is strict products lia-
bility. The third is ternied "relational responsibility" liability, which
includes Louisiana Civil Code articles 2317 (things), 2318 (children), 2321
Copyright 1988, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEw.
1. 258 La. 1067, 249 So. 2d 133 (1971).
2. Id. at 1084, 249 So. 2d at 140.
3. Id.
4. In Loescher v. Parr, 324 So. 2d 441 (La. 1975), the owner or possessor of a
thing which contained a defect and caused harm to another was held liable under article
2317. La. Civ. Code art. 2317 provides, in pertinent part: "We are responsible . . . for
that which is caused by the act of persons for whom we are answerable, or of the things
which we have in our custody." In Turner v. Bucher, 308 So. 2d 270 (La. 1975), the
court applied article 2318 to impose liability upon parents for their children's tortious
acts. La. Civ. Code art. 2318 provides, in pertinent part: "The father and mother and,
after the decease of either, the surviving parent, are responsible for the damage occasioned
by their minor or unemancipated children .... " In Holland v. Buckley, 305 So. 2d 113
(La. 1974), the court imposed liability upon animal owners for the damage caused by
their animals. In Holland, the court applied article 2321 which provides that "[t]he owner
of an animal is answerable for the damage he has caused." In Olsen v. Shell Oil Co.,
365 So. 2d 1285 (La. 1978), the court applied article 2322 to hold owners of a building
responsible when the building created an unreasonable risk of harm to others which
resulted in injury. La. Civ. Code art. 2322 states, in pertinent part: "The owner of a
building is answerable for the damages occasioned by its ruin .... "
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(animals) and 2322 (buildings).' Liability in relational responsibility cases
is imposed on the person legally responsible for the supervision, care,
or guardianship of a person or thing creating an unreasonable risk of
harm when injury results from that person or thing. This liability may
be avoided by showing that the damage was caused by the fault of the
victim (victim fault), by the fault of a third person, or by an irresistible
force. 6
Irresistible force and fault of a third person do not involve an
application of comparative negligence and are beyond the scope of this
paper. However, a discussion of the applicability of comparative neg-
ligence in a strict liability situation necessarily involves a plunge into
the confusing parameters of "victim fault" and discussion of whether
the doctrine is consistent with comparative negligence. If contributory
negligence is included within victim fault, the argument can be made
that comparative negligence is applicable to strict liability situations
because of the "[w]hen contributory negligence is applicable" condition
in the comparative negligence statute.7
The purpose of this article is to discuss whether comparative neg-
ligence is applicable in relational responsibility strict liability situations
regardless of the classification of plaiiitiff's fault. This will be accom-
plished through a brief examination of the various strict liability defenses
encompassing victim fault and their applicability to comparative negli-
gence.
Victim Fault
Prior to the development of legal fault, a tortfeasor could assert
the traditional defenses of contributory negligence or assumption of the
risk when the victim's conduct contributed to his injury. However, the
jurisprudence has refined these defenses and has employed the term
5. Robertson, Ruminations On Comparative Fault, Duty-Risk Analysis, Affirmative
Defenses, and Defensive Doctrines in Negligence and Strict Liability Litigation in Louisiana,
Ruminations on Tort Law: A Symposium in Honor of Wex Malone, 44 La. L. Rev.
1341, 1353 (1984).
6. 324 So. 2d at 447.
7. La. Civ. Code art. 2323 provides:
When contributory negligence is applicable to a claim for damages, its effect
shall be as follows: If a person suffers injury, death or loss as a result partly
of his own negligence and partly as a result of the fault of another person or
persons, the claim for damages shall not thereby be defeated, but the amount
of damages recoverable shall be reduced in proportion to the degree or percentage
of negligence attributable to the person suffering the injury, death or loss.
8. Contributory negligence is that conduct which falls below the standard of care
to which a reasonable man would conform for his own safety. Assumption of the risk
is a voluntary encountering of a known and appreciated risk. Loescher, 324 So. 2d 441.
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"victim fault" to describe the plaintiff's contributing conduct in strict
liability cases. "Victim fault" appears to have been chosen as a corollary
to the French use of the term, "la faute de ia victime," since French
authority was prevalent in interpreting the relational responsibility ar-
ticles, or it may have been chosen to articulate a term broad enough
to encompass many types of victim conduct. 9
Today, the victim's conduct must be a cause-in-fact of the harm to
serve as a defense for the tortfeasor. 10 In Langlois, assumption of the
risk, unlike contributory negligence, was recognized as a defense to
article 669 strict liability situations." The court stated that strict liability
"is not a case where negligence is an ingredient of fault and contributory
negligence is not a defense .... -12 This common law rule endured in
Louisiana, as the courts at first held that victim fault encompassed
assumption of the risk but not contributory negligence. 3 Although some
appellate circuits applied contributory negligence to strict liability actions,
these decisions were ignored by the rest of the courts and by the United
States Fifth Circuit.
The Louisiana Supreme Court squarely faced the issue in Dorry v.
Lafleur.'4 Dorry involved a plaintiff who was injured when water leaking
through a defective roof in a skating rink caused plaintiff to fall while
skating. The supreme court found that the statement in Langlois that
contributory negligence is not a defense to strict liability actions was
9. Note, A Functional Purpose for Comparing Faults: A Suggestion for Reexamining
"Strict Liability", 41 La. L. Rev. 1374, 1378 (1981).
10. See American Road Ins. Co. v. Montgomery, 354 So. 2d 656 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1977) which specifically states that "victim fault" need not be the sole cause of the injury.
Substantial factor language is used in Loescher v. Parr, 324 So. 2d 441 (La. 1975); Ruffo
v. Schwegmann Bros. Giant Supermarkets, Inc., 424 So. 2d 470 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1982),
and substantial cause is used in Rozell v. Louisiana Animal Breeders Coop., 496 So. 2d
275 (La. 1986); Mouton v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 509 So. 2d 479 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1987); Dupre v. Saenger Arts Center, Inc., 508 So. 2d 837 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1987);
Duvalle v. Lake Kenilworth, Inc., 503 So. 2d 49 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1987); Daniel v.
Cambridge Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 368 So. 2d 810 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1979). For a criticism
of the court's use of substantial cause see Kennedy, Assumption of the Risk, Comparative
Fault and Strict Liability After Rozell, 47 La. L. Rev. 791 (1987).
11. 258 La. 1067, 1086, 249 So. 2d 133, 140 (1971).
12. Id.
13. Alford v. Pool Offshore Co., 661 F.2d 43 (5th Cir. 1981); Rodrigue v. Dixilyn
Corp., 620 F.2d 537 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1113, 101 S. Ct. 923 (1981);
Langlois v. Allied Chem. Corp., 258 La. 1067, 249 So. 2d 133 (1971); Payne v. Louisiana
Dept. of Transp., 424 So. 2d 324 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1982); Verrett v. Cameron Tel.
Co., 417 So. 2d 1319 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982); see also Barham, The Viability of
Comparative Negligence as a Defense to Strict Liability in Louisiana, Ruminations on
Tort Law: A Symposium in Honor of Wex Malone, 44 La. L. Rev. 1171, 1173 (1984).
14. 399 So. 2d 559 (La. 1981).
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too broad. 5 The plurality opinion, revealing the lack of policy to sub-
stantiate such a rule, suggested that a plaintiff's contributing negligence
should bar his recovery from a strictly liable defendant when the activity
involved was neither unnatural to the locality nor a commercial enter-
prise.' 6 This determination would be made on a case by case basis.
Contributory negligence was not applied in Dorry since the plaintiff had
paid the admission price, qualifying the defendant as a commercial
enterprise.
Subsequently, the majority of strict liability cases followed the Dorry
holding.' 7 Courts began to question those decisions which had found
contributory negligence not applicable to strict liability; 8 the decisions
stressed that since the ultimate duty which arises under strict liability
and negligence is the same, with the only difference in foreseeability,
the plaintiff's contributing conduct should be analyzed the same way
under either theory. 19
At this point, the prevailing jurisprudence considered both contrib-
utory negligence and assumption of the risk, when they were substantial
factors in causing the injury,20 as encompassed within victim fault. Then
came Rozell v. Louisiana Animal Breeders Corp, Inc. ,2l which seemed
to dispel the belief that contributory negligence was a bar applicable to
a pre-comparative relational responsibility case. The Louisiana Supreme
Court, in a case which should have applied pre-comparative law, stated
that contributory negligence as a bar is not recognized as a defense to
relational responsibility strict liability cases. 22 The court supported its
position with the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 484, stating that "the
use of the strict liability doctrines leaves no room for contributory
negligence as we have known it. '"23 This language has frequently been
15. Id. at 560.
16. Id. at 560-61.
17. Hyde v. Chevron USA, Inc., 697 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1983); Buchanan v. Tan-
gipahoa Parish Police Jury, 426 So. 2d 720 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983); Falgout v. Wardlaw,
423 So. 2d 707 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1982); Williams v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 421
So. 2d 278 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1982); Carpenter v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Ins.
Co., 411 So. 2d 1206 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1982).
18. Hyde, 697 F.2d at 628 (citing Gaudet, The Application of Louisiana's Strict
Liability Law on the Outer Continental Shelf: A Quandary for Federal Courts, 28 Loy.
L. Rev. 101, 127 (1982)).
19. Buchanan, 426 So. 2d at 725.
20. CNG Producing Co. v. Columbia Gulf Transmission Corp., 709 F.2d 959 (5th
Cir. 1983); Gordon v. City of New Orleans, 430 So. 2d 234 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1983);
Buchanan, 426 So. 2d 720; Ruffo v. Schwegmann Bros. Giant Supermarkets, Inc., 424
So. 2d 470 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1982).
21. 496 So. 2d 275 (La. 1986).
22. Id. at 279 n.2, (citing Rodrigue, Alford, Verrett, and Payne; see supra note 20).
23. Id. at 280. For an extensively analyzed critique of Rozell, see Kennedy, supra
note 10.
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used in comparative negligence cases to indicate that contributory neg-
ligence as a bar to relief is no longer applicable.
Indeed, it has been submitted that despite the fact that Rozell is a
pre-comparative case, the supreme court applied comparative negligence
in an attempt to posit the Bell v. Jet Wheel Blast scheme onto relational
responsibility cases. 24 If such is the case, contributory negligence as a
bar would not exist, and the courts would apply a Bell analysis to
determine if plaintiff's recovery 9hould be reduced. Alternatively, the
court was stating that, contrary to Dorry, contributory negligence is not
applicable to relational responsibility situations.
The interpretation of Rozell is important when considering whether
comparative negligence is applicable to relational responsibility strict
liability situations. If the comparative negligence statute is interpreted
and applied literally, then only in those situations in which contributory
negligence was an available defense before the effective date of Civil
Code article 2323 would the plaintiff's contributing negligence reduce
his recovery. To this extent, pre-comparative application of contributory
negligence to strict liability situations is still relevant. 25
Landry v. State,26 decided the same day as Rozell, resolved this
dispute and supports the view that Rozell applied post-comparative law.
In Landry, the plaintiff was climbing seawall steps while carrying a fish
hamper and nets in front of his body, blocking his vision of the steps.
While attempting to avoid a hole in the steps, he fell down the seawall
and injured his knee. The supreme court found that the hole in the
steps presented an unreasonable risk of harm and held the defendant
liable under article 2317 strict liability. The court then considered whether
comparative negligence should reduce the plaintiff's recovery. Citing Bell
v. Jet Wheel Blast, the court concluded that comparative negligence
should be applied to reduce the plaintiff's recovery in relational re-
sponsibility cases if it would "give similarly situated plaintiffs a moti-
vation for exercising reasonable care in the circumstances" and yet not
diminish the defendant owner's incentive to protect against unreasonable
24. Under Bell, where the the threat of a reduction in recovery would provide the
consumers with an incentive to use a product more carefully comparative principles should
be applied. The plaintiff's recovery should not be reduced, however, in those cases where
it does not promote careful product use or where it reduces the manufacturers incentive
to make a safer product. Bell v. Jet Wheel Blast, 462 So. 2d 166, 171-72 (La. 1985).
25. In Rodrigue, in which the court held contributory negligence not applicable to
strict liability, Justice Tate stated that the holding was restricted to pre-comparative law
and that adoption of comparative negligence might involve a reevaluation of the traditional
rules. 620 F.2d at 544 n.11. Therefore, even if contributory negligence was not applicable
to strict liability in pre-comparative, policy could dictate that it be applied by analogy
anyway. This is what occurred in Bell.
26. 495 So. 2d 1284 (La. 1986)
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risks of harm to others. 27 This result is, therefore, consistent with Dorry
and Rozell and with most post-Bell cases which applied comparative
negligence to all strict liability cases when policy so dictated.
21
The jurisprudence therefore indicates that contributory negligence
does not operate as a bar in relational responsibility strict liability cases,
but should reduce the plaintiff's recovery if policy so dictates under the
Bell analysis. The applicability of assumption of the risk 29 to comparative
negligence cases will be discussed below. The remainder of this discussion
will address the differing methods for interpreting the comparative neg-
ligence statute.
Comparative Negligence
Comparative negligence first emerged under Justinian in 533 A.D.
in his Great Digest, which provided that "a party should assume damages
in proportion to his fault."30 Justinian's influence on the civil law is
arguably credited with the modern prevailing civil law rule of comparative
negligence. 3 In Louisiana, the first comparative negligence scheme was
Louisiana Civil Code article 2303 (1825) which provided: "The damage
caused is not always estimated at the exact value of the thing destroyed
or injured: it may be reduced according to circumstances, if the owner
of the thing has exposed it imprudently." This provision was readopted
as article 2323 of the 1870 Civil Code. But the Louisiana courts chose
to ignore this provision. Instead, the judiciary applied the common law
concept of contributory negligence as a bar to recovery.32
27. Id. at 1290.
28. In the recent case of Howard v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 87-C-2117 (La. Feb. 29,
1988), an eleven year old girl was attacked and bitten by a dog belonging to the insured
when she entered a fence where the dog was occupied. The supreme court found the
insured strictly liable under article 2321 and held that "comparative fault applies where
... [an) owner is held liable under art. 2321." Recognizing the difficulty of comparing
culpability where the insured was strictly liable and the plaintiff was negligent, the court
compared causation to arrive at the appropriate level of damages. A discussion of the
principles of comparative causation is beyond this article.
•29. It has been recognized that assumption of the risk is encompassed within victim
fault and is therefore a defense to strict liability actions. This has been well stated and
is not generally disputed. See Dufrene v. Fournier, 420 So. 2d 1178 (La. App. 5th Cir.
1982); Verrett v. Cameron Tel. Co., 417 So. 2d 1319 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982); Sumner
v. Foremost Ins. Co., 417 So. 2d 1327 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982); Daniel v. Cambridge
Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 368 So. 2d 810 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1979); Tri-State Ins. Co. v. Fidelity
& Casualty Ins. Co., 364 So. 2d 657 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1978).
30. Justinian, Great Digest (533).
31. H. Woods, Comparative Fault § 1:9 (2d ed. 1987).
32. Note, supra note 9, at 1378-79 n.29.
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In 1979 the Louisiana Legislature reacted to the harsh, all-or-nothing
doctrine of contributory negligence by enacting Civil Code article 2323,
the comparative negligence statute, effective August 1, 1980.13
When contributory negligence is applicable to a claim for dam-
ages, its effect shall be as follows: If a person suffers injury,
death or loss as a result partly of his own negligence and partly
as a result of the fault of another person or persons, the claim
for damages shall not thereby be defeated, but the amount of
damages recoverable shall be reduced in proportion to the degree
or percentage of negligence attributable to the person suffering
the injury, death or loss.3 4
The statute has no application to the issue of determining liability of
the parties but is limited solely to the computation of damages. While
it would seem to be a relatively easy task to apply this statute, such is
not the case in strict liability actions. Because of different interpretations
by the courts and conflicting policy considerations,35 problems are created
by the "[wihen contributory negligence is applicable" clause. The dif-
ferent interpretations given article 2323 will now be probed, concentrating
on the article's applicability to relational responsibility strict liability
under these different interpretations. The three different interpretations
are: (1) strict construction of the statute, (2) emphasis upon the authority
of the courts to decide when comparative negligence will apply, and (3)
application of comparative negligence to all situations.
36
Strict Construction
This approach involves application of comparative negligence to
those actions in which contributory negligence was a defense in pre-
comparative jurisprudence.17 One might argue that the statute was passed
at a time when the defense of contributory negligence was not available
as a defense in strict liability actions and, therefore, comparative neg-
ligence should also not be applicable in those circumstances. Although
33. Id. at 1381.
34. La. Civ. Code art. 2323 (emphasis added).
35. Barham, supra note 13, at 1172.
36. Note, "Rethinking" After Comparative Fault-Baumgartner Overruled in Turner
v. N.O.P.S.I., 46 La. L. Rev. 1071, 1074-75 (1986). Many of the arguments applicable
to one interpretation will overlap to apply to other interpretations as well.
37. This strict construction approach will mainly discuss whether comparative fault
is applicable to strict liability when contributory negligence is not found to be a defense
to such action. Naturally, if we take a literal reading of the statute and contributory
negligence is applicable to strict liability (Dorry), then comparative negligence would be
also.
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they never specifically articulated it, at one time court of appeal decisions
seemed to have taken this approach.3"
Bell, however, states that article 2323 does not prohibit the courts
from applying comparative negligence to a claim previously insusceptible
to the bar of contributory negligence.3 9 "[T]he predecessor jurisprudence
should not be controlling. Article 2323 neither states nor should be
taken to mean that the issue of the applicability of contributory neg-
ligence in strict liability cases is frozen according to the weight of pre-
comparative fault cases.''4°
The statute taken as a whole is ambiguous as to its intent in that
it contemplates a balancing of the contributing negligence of the plaintiff
and the fault (including legal fault) of the defendant in its wording:
"[I]njury, death or loss as a result partly of his own negligence and
partly as a result of the fault [negligence and strict liability] of another
person or persons." 4 1 Thus, while the first sentence seems to deny
comparative negligence applicability in strict liability situations, the sub-
sequent statutory language seems to demand the opposite result.
A strict construction reading may have some merit since strict liability
was being imposed in some situations at the time the statute was being
drafted, although none of our current strict liability theories existed.
Arguably, the statute intended to include within the term "fault" all
claims for personal injury or property damage under both negligence
and strict liability theories. Therefore, to give the statute this scope, a
plaintiff's contributory negligence should be used to reduce his recovery
in all strict liability situations, whether contributory negligence was a
defense to such a situation in pre-comparative cases or not.' 2
Courts in comparative negligence jurisdictions need not forego the
benefits of comparative negligence simply because the statute appears
to be restricted to claims based on negligence. 41 "Even in the absence
of specific statutory direction, negligence of the plaintiff should be
compared with that of the defendant in a strict liability case."" These
arguments are supported by authority which suggests that the limitation
of comparative negligence by pre-comparative jurisprudence would "pre-
38. McCaskill v. Welch, 463 So. 2d 942 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1985); Efferson v. State,
463 So. 2d 1342 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1984); Wesley v. City of Denham Springs, 455 So.
2d 1183 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1984).
39. 462 So. 2d at 170.
40. Robertson, supra note 5, at 1352.
41. La. Civ. Code art. 2323.
42. Note, Contributing Negligence-When Should it be a Defense in a Strict Liability
Action?, 43 La. L. Rev. 801, 808 (1983).
43. V. Schwartz, Comparative Negligence § 12.2 (2d ed. 1986).
44. H. Woods, Comparative Fault, § 14.49, at 327-328 (1978).
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vent the expansion of comparative principles as a complement to new
emphases in tort law. For example, the shift from negligence to strict
liability theories by the Louisiana Supreme Court might be retarded if
the comparative negligence statute cannot be invoked ' 4 because "the
very policies sought to be furthered by the statute will be frustrated.""6
Limiting comparative negligence to those situations in which con-
tributory negligence was a defense at the time the statute was drafted
does not seem to be the best interpretation to be given article 2323.
This interpretation would limit expansion into strict liability. Other ci-
vilian jurisdictions, most notably France, and other states have not
followed this strict construction approach. 47
Court's Authority to Determine Applicability"
Another interpretation of article 2323 is that the courts have the
authority to decide when contributory negligence is applicable.49 Under
this analysis, the court will determine if the defendant owed a duty to
the plaintiff at all or if his duty encompassed plaintiff's misconduct.
This will determine whether the defendant can apply contributory neg-
ligence and reduce plaintiff's recovery under article 2323.
Contributory negligence is not applicable and a plaintiff's recovery
will not be reduced in those cases in which the defendant's conduct or
activity encompasses the duty to protect the plaintiff against his own
carelessness. Such a defendant is usually a person or entity whose conduct
exposes a large number of people to a risk of harm whereas plaintiff's
conduct exposes only himself to harm. The defendant's conduct is,
therefore, more undesirable than the plaintiff's, and the defendant must
protect plaintiff from this exposure. 0
Comparative negligence is also not applied when the plaintiff has
removed himself from the scope of defendant's duty.51 Comparative
negligence is applied in all other cases in which the plaintiff has been
negligent and the defendant has a duty.
Basically, the approach involves a policy determination on each issue.
Arguably, this is exactly what the court did in Bell v. Jet Wheel Blast.52
45. Howard v. Allstate Ins. Co., 510 So. 2d 685, 693 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1987)(citing
Note, supra note '42, at 809).
46. Note, supra note 42, at 809.
47. Note, supra note 9, at 1382.
48. See generally Johnson, Comparative Negligence and the Duty/Risk Analysis, 40
La. L. Rev. 319 (1980).
49. Barham, supra note 13.
50. Johnson, supra note 48, at 333.
51. Robertson, supra note 5, at 1358.
52. 462 So. 2d 166 (La. 1985).
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In Bell, a factory worker was injured when his hand got caught in the
large shot blast machine which he was operating. The Louisiana Supreme
Court, after finding that contributory negligence as a bar is not a defense
to strict products liability, articulated that the policies which strict prod-
ucts liability attempts to impose"a allow for comparative negligence ap-
plicability in strict liability. The plaintiff's contributing negligence is
apportioned with the defendant's fault unless application would provide
no incentive for an employee to guard himself or when it would decrease
the manufacturer's incentive to build a safer product.14
Courts may use such an interpretation of article 2323 as a jury
control device to keep the final decision in the hands of the judges.
[T]o submit all questions of victim fault to juries, . . . is virtual
abandonment to juries of critical legal policy questions and
surrender of all hope of uniformity in the law. We will have
transformed duty questions into damage questions; we will have
replaced legal issues with dollars-and-cents estimates. 55
Application Across The Board
A third method of interpreting the comparative negligence article
emphasizes that the legislature intended fault to be allocated in all cases
in which a plaintiff's negligence contributes to his injuries.
Opponents of this position argue that the statute is clear in placing
a condition, that contributory negligence is applicable, on the usage of
comparative negligence. This view is supported by Justice Dennis' con-
clusion in Turner v. New Orleans Public Service Inc.-6 that "[I]egislative
intent, frequently employed by the courts in statutory interpretation, is
so obscure and uncertain as to C.C. 2323 that caution should be em-
ployed in attributing any intention to the legislature not expressed in
the statute." ' 57 However, the desire to alleviate the harsh, complete bar
to recovery, in favor of an "equitable allocation of loss between plaintiff
and defendant,' 'S is a legislative purpose that cannot be disputed. Ar-
guably this allocation should occur in all cases of plaintiff fault.
53. "(a) [Tlhe reduction of the incidence of injuries by providing an incentive for
manufacturers to produce safer products; (b) the placing of the burden of accidental
injuries caused by defective products on those who market them, to be treated as a cost
of production against which liability insurance can be obtained." Id. at 171.
54. Id. at 172.
55. Johnson, supra note 48, at 340.
56. 476 So. 2d 800 (La. 1985).
57. Id. at 804 (emphasis in original).
58. Plant, Comparative Negligence and Strict Liability, Symposium: Comparative
Negligence in Louisiana, 40 La. L. Rev. 403, 417 (1980).
1258 [Vol. 48
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Some courts find that since negligence and strict liability (which
holds a defendant liable without negligence) are theoretically distinct
concepts, they cannot be compared, preventing comparative negligence
applicability in strict liability situations. 9 Such conceptual problems with
application should not be controlling; "fflixed semantic consistency at
this point is less important than the attainment of a just and equitable
result."60
If comparative principles are not allowed to function there will
be the paradoxical situation in strict liability areas in which a
defendant who admits or is proved to be negligent will be liable
for only part of the damages caused to a contributorily negligent
plaintiff, whereas a defendant who is entirely innocent and ...
[may have] done his best, albeit unsuccessfully, to avoid causing
injury will be liable for all damages including the portion caused
by the negligent plaintiff.6
If this should happen, it most certainly would not be a just and equitable
result. In Watson v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Insurance Co.,62 Louis-
iana adopted the Uniform Comparative Fault Act's methods for quan-
tifying fault. This act quantifies the fault of both the plaintiff and
defendant and suggests that there is no insuperable difficulty with com-
paring the fault of a strictly liable defendant with that of a negligent
plaintiff or another defendant. 3
The purpose of placing the burden of liability on the defendant is
to protect the innocent and powerless plaintiff from bearing the cost
of an injury which he could do little to prevent. Obviously, a plaintiff
who is contributorily negligent can seldom be described as innocent or
powerless. 64 Moreover, it is unreasonable to force a defendant or society
to bear the total cost of losses which are partly attributable to plaintiff's
negligence. Society wants to encourage, not discourage, "due care and
prudence on the part of consumers and users as well as manufacturers" 6
and custodians of things.
59. Note, supra note 42, at 810. See also Plant, supra note 58, and Lewis v. Timco,
Inc., 697 F.2d 1252 (5th Cir.), and reh'g en banc, 716 F.2d 1425, 1433 (5th Cir. 1983)
(Politz, J., dissenting) for the proposition that comparative causation should be applied
instead of comparative negligence to avoid the theoretical difficulties.
60. Note, supra note 42, at 810 (quoting Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d
725, 734, 575 P.2d 1162, 1167-68, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380, 385 (1978) (emphasis added).
61. Plant, supra note 58, at 418.
62. 469 So. 2d 967, 973 (La. 1985). See Watson for factors to be considered when
apportioning fault.
63. Robertson, supra note 5, at 1355. See also V. Schwartz, supra note 43, §12.7,
at 212-13.
64. Plant, supra note 58, at 416.
65. Id.
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In the past, six arguments have been urged in support of the ap-
plication of comparative negligence to both products liability and re-
lational responsibility cases. (1) Complication of multiple defendant cases
would result otherwise. (2) It is inconsistent to treat negligent defendants
more favorably than strictly liable defendants. (3) Between the plaintiff
and strictly liable defendant, it is fairer to take the plaintiff's negligence
into account. (4) A deterrent effect to substandard conduct is built into
a comparative fault system. (5) Lack of a reduction in recovery when
the plaintiff has been negligent causes disrespect for the law. (6) Courts
would treat plaintiff misconduct as a bar to recovery, contrary to the
legislative intent to alleviate all-or-nothing recovery when both parties
are at fault. 66
The courts have apparently taken heed of these arguments, as they
rely on Bell in determining whether comparative negligence is applicable
on a case by case basis. The supreme court has also made it clear that
it reserves the right to determine when comparative negligence is ap-
plicable by saying that "[c]are should be taken, however, to note that
we do not hold that the victim's fault shall always reduce his compen-
sation. ''67
At this juncture, we have determined that assumption of the risk
is encompassed within victim fault and contributory negligence probably
is applicable to relational responsibility strict liability situations. Com-
parative negligence is applicable to strict liability on a case by case basis
using the Bell rationale, although strong policy factors point to its
application in all circumstances in which plaintiff is negligent. The next
question we must ask is: if assumption of the risk is applicable to strict
liability as victim fault and comparative negligence is applicable to strict
liability on a case by case basis, then is assumption of the risk subsumed
into comparative negligence or does it maintain a life of its own as a
bar to recovery?
Assumption of the Risk/Comparative Negligence
In torts literature generally, assumption of the risk has taken on
many meanings. It may represent a form of negligence in which the
plaintiff/victim proceeds unreasonably in the face of a known danger. 6
In Louisiana, assumption of the risk has been defined as a subjective
inquiry where "one must knowingly and voluntarily encounter a risk
which caused him harm and must understand and appreciate the risk
66. Robertson, supra note 5, at 1354.
67. Turner v. New Orleans Pub. Serv. Inc., 476 So. 2d at 804.
68. Robertson, supra note 5, at 1371.
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involved and accept it as well as the inherent possibility of danger
because of the risk." 69
In pre-comparative situations, both assumption of the risk and con-
tributory negligence were bars to plaintiff's recovery, and to distinguish
whether a plaintiff had assumed the risk or was contributorily negligent
was irrelevant since the result was the same. However, under Louisiana's
comparative negligence system, clarification is required because of the
language of article 2323 which seems to tie its application to the condition
that contributory negligence be applicable. A determination must be
made whether assumption of the risk remains as a bar to recovery or
is subsumed into the comparative negligence statute either by abrogating
that defense or by merging it with contributory negligence.
It is argued that in those jurisdictions in which comparative neg-
ligence has been adopted, the common law defenses should blend into
the apportionment doctrine. 70 Indeed, many states have allowed the
concept of assumption of the risk to become subsumed into comparative
fault.71 The Louisiana Supreme Court in Bell v. Jet Wheel Blast72 initially
discussed the problem in Louisiana. After finding contributory negligence
not applicable as a bar in a strict products liability case, the court
suggested that "the adoption of a system of comparative fault should,
where it applies, entail the merger of . . . assumption of risk into the
general scheme of assessment of liability in proportion to fault." 73
Bell was followed by the first circuit court of appeal in Aguillard
v. Langlois,74 where comparative negligence was applied to reduce the
recovery of a plaintiff who assumed the risk of an eye injury by standing
within forty-five feet of an operating bushhog. In addition, the Aguillard
court applied the factors for comparing fault set forth in the Uniform
Comparative Fault Act (UCFA),75 which were adopted by Louisiana in
Watson v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Insurance Co. 76 The UCFA itself
expressly indicates that unreasonable assumption of the risk, conduct
69. Rozell v. Louisiana Animals Breeders Coop., 496 So. 2d 275, 278 (La. 1986)
(citing Lytell v. Hushfield, 408 So. 2d 1344 (La. 1982)).
70. S. Flanagan & J. Palmer, Comparative Negligence Manual § 1.160, at 46 (rev.
ed. 1971).
71. Id. at §1.220, 52-53.
72. 462 So. 2d 166 (La. 1985).
73. Id. at 172.
74. 471 So. 2d 1011 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1985). Contra, Brown v. Harlan, 468 So.
2d 723 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1985), where the plaintiff's decedent, being unable to swim,
assumed the risk of wandering into the deep part of an innkeeper's pool, barring plaintiff
from recovery.
75. Aguillard, 471 So. 2d at 1015 (quoting Uniform Comparative Fault Act §2b
(1977)).
76. 469 So. 2d 967 (La. 1985).
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which is voluntary and with knowledge of the danger, is included within
the claimant's contributing fault and is to be apportioned with the
defendant's fault to reduce recovery.
However, basing the applicability of assumption of the risk on Bell
and the UCFA has been attacked as contrary to Louisiana law. It has
been suggested that Bell should be limited to its facts and that the
language above used in Bell, indicative of a legislative intent to eliminate
all-or-nothing tort recovery by alleviating assumption of the risk, was
merely dicta. 77
The dicta of Jet Wheel Blast suggests a result contemplated by
the Uniform Comparative Fault Act which deals ". . . with the
effect of plaintiff's contributory fault, and included the defenses
of 'assumption of the risk' and 'misuse of product."' ...
However, the legislature did not say "plaintiff's contributing
fault", it said "as a result partly of his own negligence." "Fault
and negligence might have been used interchangeably by the
legislature, but probably not. It is common knowledge in the
legal profession that fault includes more than negligence." ' 78
Therefore, it has been urged that, since article 2323 states that com-
parative negligence is available only if contributory negligence is appli-
cable, it should not be available when assumption of the risk is applicable. 79
In response to certification by the Fifth Circuit, the Louisiana Su-
preme Court has definitively addressed the interaction of assumption of
the risk and comparative negligence. In Murray v. Ramada Inns, Inc.,8°
the Louisiana Supreme Court held that "assumption of risk should not
operate as a total bar to recovery regardless of whether the defendant
is found negligent or strictly liable."',
The court reasoned that "assumption of risk is simply a term that
has been used to describe a form of contributory negligence '8 2 and
"[the statute clearly dictates that contributory negligence shall no longer
operate as a complete bar to recovery." 8 Since most types of plaintiff
conduct described as assumption of risk are indistinguishable from con-
tributory negligence, it would be legally inconsistent to reject contributory
77. Chatelain v. Project Square 221, 505 So. 2d 177 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1982)
(Lobrano, J., dissenting).
78. Id. at 191 (quoting from Turner v. New Orleans Pub. Serv. Inc., 476 So. 2d at
803-04) (emphasis added by the court).
79. 505 So. 2d at 191.
80. No. 87 CQ 1846 (Feb. 29, 1988).
81. Id. at 2.
82. Id. at 19.
83. Id.
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negligence as a bar yet at the same time recognize such effects for
plaintiff conduct described as assumption of the risk.Y4
The argument that had the legislature intended to alter the appli-
cation of the doctrine it would have expressly referred to assumption
of risk in Civil Code article 2323 likewise did not sway the court. "It
is equally plausible to argue that if the Legislature had intended to
preserve the defense as a total bar to recovery, it could have easily and
expressly stated that intention in article 2323."85
The intent of the court to draft a bright line rule was reflected in
the statement that "assumption of risk terminology 'is better banished
from the scene."'66 The conduct which assumption of risk had been
used to describe should now be governed by comparative fault and duty/
risk,8 7 and where the defendant is liable under negligence or strict lia-
bility, "comparative fault principles should apply, and the victims 'aware-
ness of the danger' is among the factors to be considered in assessing
percentages of fault."88
While the court held that assumption of the risk should not survive
as a distinct legal concept for any purpose, the law is unchanged in
cases "where the plaintiff, by oral or written agreement, expressly waives
or releases a future right to recover damages from the defendant.''89
Conclusion
After examining the defenses of contributory negligence, assumption
of the risk, and comparative negligence in strict liability, three facts are
clear: (1) Assumption of the risk was included in victim fault; (2)
Contributory negligence no longer exists as a bar in Louisiana; (3)
Comparative negligence is applicable to strict liability at least on a case
by case basis. As Louisiana courts attempt to clarify strict liability
defenses, the following pattern emerges. A plaintiff's conduct should be
examined in determining whether the defendant owed a duty under
Louisiana Civil Code articles 2317-2322. If the defendant is strictly liable
and the plaintiff contributed to the injury, the court will apply com-
parative fault principles if doing so would increase the plaintiff's incentive
to act prudently and still not decrease the defendant's incentive to
84. Id. at 18.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 20 (citing McGrath v. American Cyanamid Co., 41 N.J. 272, 196 A.2d
238 (1963)).
87. No. 87 CQ 1846 (Feb. 29, 1988) at 17.
88. Id. at 20 (citing Watson v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 469 So. 2d 967,
974 (La. 1985)).
89. No. 87 CQ 1846 (Feb. 29, 1988) at 20.
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maintain reasonably safe premises and animals for which they are re-
sponsible (the Bell analysis). In applying comparative fault, the court
may compare causation and the victim's "awareness of the danger"
among the factors to be considered in assessing percentages of fault.
Contributory negligence and assumption of the risk no longer operate
as a bar but are subsumed into the concept of comparative fault. Whether
the courts will adopt this exact analysis is not completely resolved,
although it does seem likely.
Robert V. Vitanza
